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   GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
PUBLIC RISK 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Risk represents the unknown future: an intangible commodity. Public risk may 
affect any part of society and government is expected to respond, implying a need for 
governance and accountability. Public risk governance though is complicated by the 
multiplicity of different stakeholders and the network of interactions. We explore public 
risk governance through the actors involved in public risk governance and accountability. 
Through synthesis of the related and theoretically consistent concepts of governance, 
stakeholder theory and social network theory we develop the concept and underlying 
principles of ‘knowledgeable supervision’ as a means of public risk governance.  
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GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
PUBLIC RISK 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The discourse on ‘good’ governance of public risk requires a theoretical framework 
for the governance and accountability. The framework can be synthesized from related 
and theoretically consistent concepts of governance, stakeholder theory and social 
network theory. Arising from this we propose the concept of ‘knowledgeable 
supervision’ as a means of governance. 
Several recent events can be defined within the sphere of public risk: the Japanese 
earthquake, tsunami and nuclear reactor disaster (Strickland, 2011); the financial crisis 
(Brigo at al., 2010); the UK telephone hacking (BBC News, 2013a); Norwegian killings 
(BBC News, 2012c); and English anti-austerity riots (Rogers et al., 2011). The nuclear 
reactor disaster, the telephone hacking and the financial crisis can be regarded as failures 
of management or values/beliefs within organisations/society, but arguably illustrate a 
deficit in public risk governance.  A distinction can be made between risks that are 
preventable (financial crises and telephone hacking) or unpreventable (earthquakes and 
tsunamis); this will influence the nature and scope of risk governance.  
For unpreventable risks, ‘Acts of God’, the focus is on government intervention to 
control the impact and consequence of the risk (i.e. government can implement building 
regulations to ensure buildings can withstand the impact of earthquakes); the lack of or 
poor implementation can be regarded as a failure of risk governance.  For preventable 
risks, the scope of risk governance is arguably wider including prevention or 
minimisation as well as management of the impact and consequence of the risk.  
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‘Public risk’ as a concept is not well-established in academic literature (Burgess, 
2009), and so provides an inspiration for the current paper. Since the events listed above 
can be viewed as failures to manage risks, the emphasis is given to governance and 
accountability. Thus, it is necessary to consider all stakeholders affecting or affected by 
the governance of the risk, their role and salience both individually and collectively as a 
network of stakeholders.  
Public risk encompasses a diversity of risks from natural hazards, engineering, 
finance and social domains: anything likely to have an impact on the public. Each domain 
can be regarded as discrete, described as ‘Archipelagos of Risk’ (The Royal Society, 
1992).  This has provided a rich set of approaches for managing risks, but also many 
divisions in the methods taken. Hood et al. (2001) provide a typology of approaches 
through the concept of ‘risk regulation regimes’.  
Different technologies and regimes have been developed to address the specific 
form of risk within each domain, leading to each domain developing a separate language 
of risk: a ‘Tower of Babel’. ‘Risk appetite’, common in Enterprise Risk Management 
(COSO, 2004), may be an anathema to those working in safety who would suppose there 
is no appetite for risk. Similarly, risk analysis has a different meaning in industrial risk and 
financial risk management; the former quantifying the probability of a known event 
occurrence (Paté-Cornell, 2002) and the latter identifying and assessing factors that may 
affect the success of achieving the goal.  
A key dilemma for public risk governance is how to develop an appropriate form 
of governance (and accountability) that deals with both the specificity and the generality 
of the risk context. A single ‘recipe’ or an approach geared too closely to a particular 
context may run the risk of being too narrowly focussed or even distorted by the specific 
context. The Basel II Accord for the regulation of banking aimed to calculate the level of 
capital to be set aside as the buffer against unexpected risks (Haldane, 2011) but failed to 
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protect several banks from the capital shortages in the recent financial crisis. A further 
complication is the nature of risk itself, which is intangible and a debatable concept.  
We propose the concept of ‘knowledgeable supervision’ as an approach to the 
governance and accountability of public risk. Our concept of knowledgeable supervision 
is broad enough to be applied to a range of contexts, being made specific by the 
knowledge base required by the context. It is also an inclusive concept assuming that all 
those involved have a ‘duty of care’ (e.g. Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974), shifting 
the responsibility of the risk from the sole concern of management to a shared 
responsibility of all those involved. Hence all stakeholders inherently should act as 
‘knowledgeable supervisors’.  
This addresses the criticism of governance that has concentrated the management 
of the risk in the hands of a few actors who may not have sufficient knowledge or skill to 
fully appreciate and deal with the risk. An example was the launch of NASA’s Challenger 
Space Shuttle which exploded during take-off, killing all astronauts on board. 
Management decided on the launch and over-ruled expert advice about the high 
likelihood of the explosion (see Boisjoly and Curtis, 1990). Our concept of 
knowledgeable supervision is thus distributive, based on shared ownership and 
embedded and shared accountability.  Four key principles underpin the concept and are 
discussed fully in the paper: the co-ordinating role of government, shared responsibility, 
interdependence, authority versus accountability. 
The paper is based on a review of the literature, observation of recent risk events 
and the authors’ involvement with the Risk and Regulation Advisory Council’s (RRAC) 
initiative on Public Risk (see Andreeva et al. 2009a, 2009b).  Caperchione and Lapsley 
(2001:103) note: “The government domain is heavily circumscribed by policy makers and 
there are constraints which they may place on researchers to prevent the publication of 
sensitive data”.  Hence, it is far from simple to encompass the interactions and debates 
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about policy making that arise within government even if one has been given privileged 
access, as is illustrated by Rhodes (2007). Our paper is thus necessarily theoretically 
grounded. 
The following section provides more detail on the definition and concept of public 
risk. We then present a theoretical framework for the governance and accountability of 
public risk by synthesizing the theoretically consistent concepts of governance, 
stakeholder theory and social network theory. This is followed by a detailed discussion of 
how the framework can be applied to the governance of public risk by discussing the 
concept of ‘knowledgeable supervision’ and its underlying principles.    
  
RISK AND PUBLIC RISK 
Risk refers to a future event which may or may not occur and which may have 
positive or negative consequences (Ansell and Wharton, 1992). The traditional Western 
view of risk has negative connotations; hence risk governance is aimed at minimising or 
eliminating adverse consequences. The different perceptions of risk may be framed in the 
ontological spheres of positivism and constructivism. Positivists would see a role for 
quantifying and managing risk while constructivists see risks as socially constructed 
which need to be socially/culturally addressed (The Royal Society, 1992).   
Complacency about public risks has developed due to the mythic belief that 
modern society can regulate risks. When a risk occurs, it is therefore more disorientating. 
This lack of acknowledgement of the public towards their responsibility for the risk they 
face, or may take, leads naturally to the demand for action to ‘tackle’ the risk. Many 
examples can be quoted: the recent high profile cases where a child has been attacked by 
a dog, leading to calls for more controls on owners of ‘dangerous dogs’ (Usherwood, 
2013), a child at risk dies prompting calls for earlier action in child protection cases 
(Jones, 2008) or the recent financial crisis.  Government is expected to act if there is a 
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food or medical scare. Our trust in authorities is affected by their ability to govern the 
risk, in turn impacting on their credibility (Josang and Presti, 2004; Blind, 2007; 
Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2005; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004).  
‘Public risk’ is primarily used in regulation documents (e.g. RRAC, 2009a) and has 
been defined as ‘those risks that may affect any part of society and for which government 
is expected to respond’ (RRAC, 2009a:3). This view implies an agency relationship in 
which the government is regarded as the agent in managing the risk and the principals 
could be regarded as the public and other risk stakeholders.  One important aspect of 
public risk, though, is the multiplicity of different stakeholders or actors who, via a 
complex network of interactions, determine a particular response in a particular situation. 
These ‘risk actors’ or ‘risk stakeholders’ and the interactions between them make up the 
‘risk landscape’ (RRAC, 2009b). This has been explored by the Risk and Regulation 
Advisory Council (RRAC, 2009b), including the role of civil servants and politicians in 
the domain of public risk (Andreeva et al., 2009a, 2009b). 
Often it is difficult to establish who is responsible for a public risk, whether it 
should be shared, and how it should be shared.  Government is just one of the actors in 
the risk landscape. A more complex interpretation of agency theory is necessary where 
one recognises the multiplicity of roles each risk actor may play. At times the government 
may act as principal and at others times as agent. Figure 1 illustrates a network based 
view in which the responsibility for public risk rests with all stakeholders through the 
mechanism of ‘knowledgeable supervision’ with distribution of responsibility and  
increase in the shared ownership, and hence arguably a greater ability to deal with risk. 
Clearly though participants will be restricted by their knowledge and capability to act.  
The framework in Figure 1 sets the context for the remainder of the paper. It 
illustrates a number of key points. It demonstrates the complexity of the ‘risk landscape’ 
comprising a variety of different stakeholders, the number and type of which may change 
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depending on the situation; hence the ‘risk actors’ should not be viewed as exhaustive. It 
supports the idea of distributive governance and the responsibility that should be shared 
across the network. The centrality of the Public is highlighted as the main stakeholder for 
whom protection is sought, and of Government, as a possible co-ordinator of the 
distributive governance.  
The arrows in the diagram emphasize the idea of dependence (one-directional 
influence) and inter-dependence (two-directional arrows) of the ‘risk actors’. Each 
specific situation may lead not only to the change of risk actors, but also to the change of 
influences (i.e. directions of arrows) in the diagram.  
The behaviour and actions of government and the public, as having the main 
concerns over public risk, are shaped by how they interact with and respond to the other 
stakeholders. The nature of the relationships is dynamic with each actor negotiating or 
attempting to influence others’ actions. For example, the media attract audiences, alert, 
inform and campaign; pressure groups inform, campaign and stimulate response; experts 
provide a source of specialist knowledge, judgement or expertise; Parliament and other 
politicians put pressure on ministers to act; the National Audit Office (NAO) will hold 
government to account of its actions. Government will both be influenced by and 
attempt to influence the media, experts and ultimately the public. 
The risk of child abuse provides a useful illustration of ‘knowledgeable 
supervision’. The media often highlights a specific case and brings it to the attention of 
other stakeholders (e.g. the Public). Experts, including social workers, the police, schools 
and the local Child Protection Committee for an individual child, will have to make a 
decision on how secure or ‘at risk’ the child in question is. They may be influenced by the 
courts, the media, the local public, pressure groups (such as charities or the church), the 
local authority and the Department for Education. The climate will be influenced by 
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international norms of treatment of children and human rights established by 
international bodies (e.g. Amnesty International). 
‘Knowledgeable supervision’ suggests that by distributing responsibility for the risk 
it will be governed in such a way as to minimise or prevent the occurrence of the risk.  
Consistent with this view, Harker et al (2013:6) argue that “a different approach to child 
protection is needed, one that does more to prevent abuse “upstream” rather than 
intervening to stop it once it has already happened”. The National Audit Office (2013) 
refers to this as ‘Early Action’ aimed at addressing causes rather than symptoms. Harker 
et al. (2013:4), argue that everyone who works with children - including teachers, medical 
professionals, social workers etc. - has a responsibility for keeping them safe (HM 
Government, 2013). The Department for Education (underpinned by legislation through 
the Children Acts of 1989 and 2004) has overall responsible for child protection in 
England and issues guidance to local authorities (e.g. Working together to safeguard children 
(HM Government, 2013)). Local Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs) in England use 
the guidance to ensure that key agencies work effectively together to safeguard children 
at a local level. Despite these formal ‘knowledgeable supervisors’, Harker et al. (2013) 
note that most children who are abused or neglected are not known to the services, and 
recognises the wider role of society. Indeed, most adults think that greater responsibility 
rests with parents, families, friends and neighbours to prevent child abuse rather than 
with government (Harker et al., 2013).  
Charities, such as ChildLine and NSPCC, play a role in protection of children and 
supporting adults. Supporting individual children they develop knowledge that can 
inform schools and social services as well as children and parents to better protect 
themselves as knowledgeable supervisors of the risks of abuse.  Hence each risk actor 
plays a role to play in supervising the risk and brings its own knowledge to bear on the 
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situation. Each risk actor must also bear some responsibility for its actions and be 
accountable for them. 
 
Figure 1: Possible key stakeholders in public risk governance with their main 
interactions  
 
STAKEHOLDER AND NETWORK VIEWS OF 
PUBLIC RISK GOVERNANCE 
Figure 1 illustrates that governance is wider than government alone and more 
inclusive. “In much of the public and political debate, governance refers to sustaining co-
ordination and coherence among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and 
objectives such as political actors and institutions, corporate interests, civil society, and 
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transnational organizations.” (Pierre, 2000:3-4). In a review of various definitions of 
governance Kitthananan (2006: 2-3) observes that the central themes of governance 
involve “… a transformation in the role, compass, power, and the activities of state in 
economy and society … It widens the roles, responsibilities and burdens of social actors 
outside the state terrain.” In this complex, devolved mode of governance, the unit of 
analysis is the network of actors or stakeholders and addressing governance requires  
“attending to social partners and ideas about how to concert action among them” 
(O’Toole and Meier, 2000: 276). 
Government remains one of the core constituents; though, public risks are 
increasingly seen as generic societal problems which need to be addressed by political 
institutions as well as other actors. The government no longer has sole control of the 
orchestration of governance which also poses potential problems in terms of 
accountability. Governance is thus more about how to maintain the steering role of 
government and political institutions. Donaldson (1992) suggests that government’s role 
is to ensure that the risk is adequately justifiably distributed amongst the stakeholders. 
Hence, government may regulate the relationship between players, such as between 
professional bodies and the public, but government cannot be the sole arbitrator of such 
distribution as all stakeholders have a responsibility in line with their capability to 
supervise the risk: ‘knowledgeable supervision’. Given this extension it is appropriate to 
look to stakeholder theory to examine the relationships in the governance of public risk 
taking into account the social networks that have evolved in such governance.  
Stakeholder theory developed as an organisational theory to understand ‘to whom 
and to what’ the organisation should pay attention. It helps to understand how 
stakeholders may behave and how the main actor (such as government) may deal with 
stakeholders. The stakeholder approach “presents the stakeholder model as a map in 
which the firm is the hub of a wheel and stakeholders are at the ends of spokes around a 
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wheel” (Frooman, 1999: 191). In this model relationships are conceived as dyadic, 
independent of one another and viewed largely from the main actor’s vantage point. In 
social networks an actor does not deal with a single stakeholder, but multiple 
stakeholders simultaneously, with interdependent relationships among these stakeholders 
(Rowley, 1997). In the context of public risk, stakeholder relationships are multilateral, 
often coalitional, not bilateral and independent. Each stakeholder is part of the nexus of 
implicit and explicit contracts. In relation to policy areas of health and welfare, Milward 
and Provan (2000: 243) note, “…joint production and having several degrees of 
separation between the source and the user of government funds … combine to ensure 
that hierarchies and markets will not work and that networks are the only alternative for 
collective action.” 
Public risk governance therefore is about autonomous self-governing networks of 
actors that involve not just influencing government policy but “taking over the business 
of government” (Stoker, 1998: 23). It recognises the capacity to get things done which 
does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority. This 
necessarily raises issues of accountability. Unless appropriately orchestrated there is the 
potential for leadership failure when dealing with public risk which can affect so many of 
the stakeholders. Differences often exist amongst key stakeholders in terms of goals, 
priorities and time horizons and these may lead to social conflicts, all of which can result 
in governance failure. This is similar to the notion of multiple accountabilities identified 
by Edwards and Hulme (1995) in their work into NGO performance and accountability, 
leading to the potential for over- or under accounting. In the context of ‘knowledgeable 
supervision’, the extent of over- or under supervision will depend on stakeholder or risk 
actor salience, agency and risk responsibility, motivations and participation, all of which 
are explored in the following sections. 
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Stakeholder salience 
A key consideration when faced with multiple stakeholders is to whom and to what 
the main actor has to pay attention. Stakeholder salience (Mitchell et al., 1997) is the 
degree to which the main actor gives salience to competing stakeholder claims. 
Stakeholders can be identified by their possession of any combination of three attributes: 
power to influence, legitimacy of the relationship and urgency of stakeholder’s claim. 
Stakeholder salience is positively related to the volume of attributes (Mitchell et al. 1997). 
These attributes, however, are variable, are not fixed, are socially constructed, and hence 
do not represent an objective reality.  
As an indication of the variability of salience Frooman (1999) notes that 
controversy has surrounded the importance of legitimacy as a stakeholder attribute, 
arguing that the legitimacy or appropriateness of a stakeholder’s claim may not matter 
nearly as much as the ability of the stakeholder to affect the direction or influence. In this 
regard, Frooman (1999) considers the resource dimensions of a relationship and the 
power that stems from it using resource dependence theory. This, he argues, adds a 
structural dimension to the consideration of stakeholder theory. Indeed, in the context of 
public risk this would seem to be reasonable since the individual members of the public 
have limited power and resource, but the overall relationship with the public carries 
significant weight. This weight increases with proximity to general elections and can also 
be increased by working with allies or through other powerful relationships (such as the 
media), what Frooman (1999) refers to as ‘pathways of influence’. 
Governance in this context identifies the power dependence in the relationships 
involved in the collective action; it can define the dependency of the actors on each other 
and emphasise the social dimension of the network in which individual stakeholder 
power can be increased through relationships with other stakeholders. The MMR 
vaccination provides an example in the UK during the late 1990s. An “expert’s” evidence 
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(subsequently discredited) was amplified by the media and sufficiently influenced the 
public to bring about a drop in MMR vaccinations. The consequence was a recent major 
outbreak of a measles epidemic in Swansea (BBC News, 2013b). 
 
Agency and risk responsibility 
Arguably in public risk there is more fluidity in the definition of the principal-agent 
relationship: government can be either principal or agent depending on the context. In 
child welfare the development of a child depends partially on the actions taken by the 
parents (agents) that may be influenced by government (principal), but the child’s 
development will also depend on the school system regulated by government (agent) on 
behalf of the parent and society (principal) (Cigno et al., 2003).  
In our notion of knowledgeable supervision government may often determine the 
rules and regulations; occupy a co-ordinating role and/or set the boundaries, but it is not 
the sole determinant of these boundaries. Moreover, it may not have sufficient skill or 
capability to deal with the risk and others may command control over significant 
elements and/or have remarkable influence over action in dealing with public risk. The 
temporary closure of the UK’s Leeds children’s heart transplant unit was based on 
performance data produced by researchers keen to publish early that was later shown to 
be incomplete and insufficient on which to base an opinion (BBC News, 2013a).  
In general, though, the public (principals) may look to government (agent) 
composed of politicians and civil servants to take action. In this case the agent is subject 
to the views of the public and is expected to respond to them (so-called ‘demanding 
stakeholders’), but also needs to be aware of latent or dormant stakeholders (Mitchell et 
al., 1997), who can become ‘demanding’ stakeholders given the right conditions.  Hence, 
the relationship of the stakeholders (the public) in this scenario cannot simply be 
classified as influencers or claimants.  
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Clarkson (1994) suggests that stakeholders may be voluntary or involuntary risk-
bearers. Whereas voluntary stakeholders are aware of the risks they take on, involuntary 
stakeholders are instead (unknowingly) placed at risk by the actions of others (for 
example in the financial crisis). In public risk involuntary risk-bearers are a group where 
the principal-agent relationship becomes critical. Involuntary stakeholders may lack 
empowerment and become removed from risk governance. Hence they naturally look to 
government or some authority to manage the risk and take responsibility for them. This 
has implications for the perceived responsibility of stakeholders and links to Mulgan’s 
(2000) notion of ‘accountability as control’, the external view of accountability, and 
‘accountability as responsiveness’, the extent to which government pursues the wishes 
and needs of citizens.  
The various forms of accountability noted by Mulgan (2000) are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, neither are they static. Sinclair (1995) notes accountability to be 
subjectively constructed and has the ability to change, being sustained and given extra 
dimensions of meaning by its context; what she refers to as the ‘chameleon of 
accountability’.  Moreover, being accountable in one form often requires compromises of 
other sorts of accountability. Within the context of public risk and social actors all or 
some of these various forms of accountability may co-exist. The issue is deriving the 
appropriate ‘accountability’ which has to be in line with the capability of the stakeholder 
to deal with the risk. Where the public is put into the position of involuntary stakeholder 
in a risk situation, the roles of other risk actors (as agents) increase in terms of raising risk 
awareness so that the public can become more knowledgeable. This is recognised in 
RRAC’s practical strategies for policy makers (RRAC, 2009a). 
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Stakeholder motivations 
Much of the literature on stakeholders focuses on the influence of stakeholders 
over the central actor and how the central actor might manage its stakeholder influence. 
In any form of social exchange the parties involved will be motivated by perceptions of 
rewards and costs. The motivation or costs of the risk actors towards dealing with a risk 
are rarely simple and it is often hard to justify generalisation. In many instances the 
motivations are well-intentioned and make a positive contribution to society, such as the 
ban on smoking in public places (BBC News, 2012b). In some cases, though, the 
motivations of some stakeholders can cause problems such as the examples of the MMR 
crisis or Basel II regulation discussed previously. RRAC notes the behaviour of ‘risk-
mongers’, stakeholders who “conjure up or exaggerate risk inappropriately … in order to 
create some kind of advantage for themselves, such as financial gain, attention, power or 
even job security.” (RRAC, 2009b:3) 
Specific motivation of the stakeholders in Figure 1 has attracted little research, 
though, the motivations of civil servants have been considered with little consensus. 
Some have suggested civil servants act as self-serving (Niskanen, 1971, 1973; Dunleavy, 
1991), whereas others have been more positive in terms of the desire to serve society, 
(Downs, 1967; Noordegraaf, 2007; Rhodes, 2007) and the desire to take responsibility for 
tackling issues and making a difference (Noordegraaf, 2007). Some suggest the 
motivation is driven more by game playing and competiveness as exemplified by “fun 
and playfulness of it”(Lynn, 1987) and “quick wins” (Rhodes, 2007). They may respond 
aligned to the benefit or damage that might accrue from the risk. If there is potential 
reputational risk then Hood et al. (2001) have suggested that civil servants will employ 
‘blame avoidance’ strategies, though this is disputed by civil servants (see Andreeva et al. 
2009b). Merely deciding which risk to take action on and which not to inherently 
involves taking risks, both personally and on behalf of others. 
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Government obtains its legitimacy through the public’s willingness to accept its 
actions. The choices it makes will be based on beliefs about the salience given to the 
group it wishes to serve. Urgency of response will be moderated by government’s own 
motivation, and this may depend on particular politicians and senior civil servants.  The 
public’s relationship to the risk is critical to government’s reaction.  Governments often 
wish to create the air of authority even in areas where they have little control, as 
illustrated in the following quote from Geoffrey Howe : “The history of post-war British 
Cabinets has been a continuous story of people trying to do too much, believing that 
they had power over events which in fact they lacked, treating national circumstances as 
entirely within their control and twirling the wheel on the bridge as though every move 
would produce an instant response in some well-oiled engine room below.” (Hennessy, 
1990). 
Many authors (Portinga and Pidgeon 2005, Wrench 2007, Engineering Council 
2011) argue that clarity and transparency are the first stage to dealing with a risk. 
Increasing the transparency and distributing responsibility and accountability for the risk 
among stakeholders may lead to less game-playing and distorted motivations. 
 
Stakeholder participation 
Stoker’s (1998) claim that governance is about collective decision-making, 
specifically including public and private actors, suggests greater participation of 
stakeholders and collaboration. According to Ansell and Gash (2007:544), ‘collaborative 
governance’ has emerged in response to the “…failures of downstream implementation 
and to the high cost and politicization of regulation”. As such, it represents “…an 
alternative to the adversarialism of interest group pluralism and to the accountability 
failures of managerialism.” More positively, though, and consistent with our concept of 
‘knowledgeable supervision’, Ansell and Gash argue that the trend towards collaboration 
18 
 
evolves from the growth in knowledge and capacity. They argue that as “knowledge 
becomes increasingly specialised and distributed and … infrastructures become more 
complex and interdependent the demand for collaboration increases.” (Ansell and Gash, 
2007: 544).  
Public participation specifically brings about opportunities for incorporating 
societal concerns as well as ‘non-standard’ knowledge in the governance of risks (De 
Marchi, 2003). This is consistent with Mulgan’s (2000) notion of ‘accountability as 
dialogue’ relating to the public discussion on which democracies depend. De Marchi 
(2003) contends that in modern society the general public includes many scientifically 
literate people and to “treat them all as ignorant and uninformed is not only politically 
incorrect, but also pragmatically ineffective, as it discards an opportunity unique to 
modern democratic societies.” (De Marchi, 2003:174).  
Securing public participation and collaboration, though, is not without its 
problems. English (2000) observes that the more diffuse the affected stakeholders and 
the more long-term or unclear the problem horizon the more difficult it will be to 
represent stakeholders in collaborative processes. Not all stakeholders will possess the 
skill and expertise to engage in discussions. Ansell and Gash (2007) suggest that 
successful collaborative governance processes are contingent on time, trust and 
interdependence.  
Osborne and Brown (2011) argue that if one accepts the social construction of risk 
then risk governance is a form of negotiation between the stakeholders. This advances 
the notion of collaboration from participating in the solution to that of negotiating both 
the problem (risk) and the solution. The beliefs about risk essentially become the debate 
about the risk. There may however be difficulties in reaching agreement about the 
beliefs, due to stakeholders having their own view of the risk.  Risk is contextual and 
dynamic: it is dependent upon various organisational, cultural and attitudinal aspects. 
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Each stakeholder has their own view of the risk; this is represented in the language used 
to describe the risk which impacts on the approach to risk governance. This is included 
in what Goddard (2005) refers to as accountability habitus, building on Bourdieu’s (1990) 
notion of habitus.  
Even when there is general agreement over the goals, negotiation may develop into 
a game between the proponents; such as the implementation of the Basel II Accord, 
where regulators gave responsibility for defining the risk management approaches to the 
lenders and then accepted the approach specified through discussion.  Haldane (2011) 
suggested this may have led to game playing on the part of lenders. The extent to which 
this may occur (and did occur in the case of Basel II) depends on the power relationships 
in existence and links to the notion of stakeholder salience (i.e. larger banks ended up 
being subjected to disproportionately less regulation). 
 
PUBLIC RISK GOVERNANCE AS ‘KNOWLEDGEABLE SUPERVISION’ 
For the governance of public risk we therefore propose ‘knowledgeable 
supervision’. ‘Knowledgeable supervision’ recognises that government does not have 
complete control but can oversee, steer and coordinate. ‘Supervision’ implies that other 
actors must also take an active role and responsibility in the process, akin to the network 
or partnership approaches advocated in models of new governance (Rhodes 2000). 
Supervision of the risks is distributed across the network of risk actors and stakeholders 
who share in the responsibility for the management of the risk and are accountable for 
their own behaviour.  
‘Knowledgeable’ means having knowledge and understanding of the issues and 
also knowing how to act/respond. However, knowledge not only rests with government: 
the knowledge and expertise of others is also important. Indeed, others who might be 
less knowledgeable or have no expert authority (such as the public) nonetheless have a 
20 
 
responsibility to keep themselves informed. It also recognises that knowledge is not static 
and requires revisiting and updating as contexts change and evolve.  
A key consideration is how to ‘knowledgeably supervise’ the unknown. ‘Black 
swans’, (Taleb, 2004 and 2007), describe rare events: outliers of extreme impact that are 
unpredictable.  They represent the ultimate epistemic uncertainty or lack of fundamental 
knowledge (Paté-Cornell, 2012) where not only the distribution of the parameter is 
unknown, but also the very existence of the phenomenon itself. Taleb (2007) argues that 
in such instances our awareness is limited and our ability to predict or conceive of such 
an event occurring is restricted by our conceptions. These events have been wrongly 
characterised by Gaussian (normal) curves that fail to account for the “fat tails” of loss 
distributions (i.e. underestimate the probability of occurrence of rare events) (Taleb, 
2007) and also failed to account adequately for the interdependence amongst the 
financial risks that banks were faced with that led to the recent financial crisis (Brigo et 
al., 2010; MacKenzie and Spears, 2012). Hence, banks took on more risk than they knew 
they were taking which increased financial instability.   
Rarely though do individuals fully understand the situations they are managing.  
This may be attributed to: lack of experience, over-belief in models, failure to question 
assumptions, inability to recognise salient factors or to distinguish between predictable 
and unpredictable risks.  Governance comprises performance and conformance (Short et 
al., 1999): arguably the financial community became overly focused on conformance with 
the Basel II Accords at the expense of performance possibly distracting regulators and 
banks from the real developing risks that led to the financial crisis. A focus on the 
implementation of rules without questioning the validity of the rules to achieve the goal 
is a potential recipe for failure of risk governance.  
Paté-Cornell (2012) argues that “Black Swans” has been used as an excuse for poor 
risk management. She suggests the focus should be on making use of existing knowledge, 
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noting signals of risk, than searching for the unpredictable: a systemic approach to risk 
management rather than an event-focused approach. This should be proactive using all 
available information; monitoring signals, pre-cursors and near-misses (Paté-Cornell, 
2012). This is akin the advocated approach to child protection (see Harker et al., 2013 
and the National Audit Office, 2013). 
A wider group may lead to a greater ability to see the dangers of ‘Black Swans’ and 
so we should harness all available information and knowledge from the network of 
stakeholders (supervisors). We now outline four key principles that underpin our notion 
of knowledgeable supervision: the co-ordinating role of government, shared 
responsibility, interdependence, and authority versus accountability. 
The co-ordinating role of government - The notion of ‘knowledgeable 
supervision’ recognises that government does not (and may not wish to) have complete 
control over the governance of a risk situation, but can oversee, guide and coordinate 
and can, when necessary, pass acts or make changes to regulation. It is not the exclusive 
preserve of government to govern, but its role is to influence, shape, regulate or 
determine outcomes. “In much of the public and political debate, governance refers to 
sustaining co-ordination and coherence among a wide variety of actors with different 
purposes and objectives such as political actors and institutions, corporate interests, civil 
society, and transnational organizations” (Pierre, 2000: 3-4):, such as the actors illustrated 
in Figure 1.  
Risk governance has swung between regulation and deregulation depending on the 
most recent disaster and the desire to cut red tape. The Financial Services Industry was a 
heavily regulated business which was freed from many restrictions during an active 
period of deregulation based on the assumption that those involved in the risk were best 
placed to manage the risk effectively.  It was assumed they were knowledgeable and 
skilled to deal with the risk. The role of government was primarily to monitor and 
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provide guidance and have official sanction if poor management occurred. The period of 
deregulation though led to issues around ‘mis-selling’. Self-regulation or market 
regulation also formed the pillar of the Basel II Accord which has been criticised for its 
part in the financial crisis. Whilst it is understood that those dealing with a risk ought to 
be most capable of managing that risk, there also needs to be adequate supervision of 
those involved with the risk, and supervision has to be capable: knowledgeable 
supervision.  The wider the supervision is distributed across the network of stakeholders, 
the more likely it will be that the risk will be managed appropriately. 
Shared responsibility – Public risk governance requires a set of institutions and 
actors that are drawn from but also extend beyond government. While Figure 1 depicts 
government at the centre of the diagram, this does not imply a central place in terms of 
power but rather a co-ordinating role; a conduit through which responsibility flows out 
to other actors and stakeholders, not the central controller of direction and actions.  A 
shift in responsibility ‘from the centre’ to ‘through the centre’ whereby government is 
one of the many actors involved with a shared responsibility.  
From the public’s point of view this may pose problems since they may expect 
government to take responsibility. Shared responsibility increases the opacity of 
governance to the public. Clarity and transparency are key; the public wishes to feel 
secure and believe that government is providing protection. When Prime Minister 
Clement Atlee decided on the UK nuclear strategy there was no discussion in Cabinet or 
Parliament, (Thorpe, 2001; Scott, 2006). Such action would no longer be deemed 
acceptable. Indeed, knowledgeable supervision requires supervision that can be trusted; 
neither government nor self interest groups dominating.  It should allow for consultation 
and dialogue with the public; such as the approach taken by the UK Environment 
Agency in terms of stakeholder engagement for potential new nuclear power stations 
(Environment Agency, 2010). 
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Interdependence – Interdependence is a function of the social system and shared 
responsibility. It further reinforces the notion that there is no single source of 
knowledge, power or control. The various actors involved are to a degree dependent on 
each other (HM Government, 2013). It also implies that the capacity is shared, 
negotiated and mediated. There is not a strict separation between dependent and 
independent actors, which alludes to the ‘external’ view of governance (Mulgan 2000). 
This view sits part-way between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ conceptualisations of governance. 
‘Old governance’ refers to the steering capacity of government; steering society through 
political brokerage (Pierre and Peters 2000). It assumes that society requires an 
externally-imposed authority. ‘New governance’ is based on co-ordination and self-
governance manifested in networks and partnership approaches (Rhodes, 1996, 1997). 
The move from old to new governance implies a shift from hierarchy to heterarchy. 
Governance under such a system relies on others to be involved (HM Government, 
2013). Our notion of knowledgeable supervision implies a situation where individual 
actors involved in governance are dependent on the knowledge of others (the public is 
often dependent on the knowledge of experts).  
Authority versus accountability - In the context of public risk governance, the 
link between governance and accountability is not straightforward. The web of 
interactions and shared responsibilities creates complex relationships. There is a blurring 
of boundaries, responsibilities and accountability. In many senses responsibilities are 
shifting, away from government towards the public and other stakeholders. This is 
perhaps one of the unintended consequences.  
Under the notion of knowledgeable supervision there may be a separation between 
identifying those with authority or responsibility (for example policy formulation of law) 
and those with accountability for implementation. The downside of this separation is the 
capacity of social forces to resist regulations and impositions – the view that citizens 
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know better. The role of governance in this context is to ensure not only shared 
responsibility but also a shared understanding of the consequences of not acting 
responsibly (as in the case of MMR vaccinations). There needs to be greater 
understanding of the motivation of those who are charged with risk governance. The 
accountability for their decisions should be regulated by the knowledgeable supervisors.  
The supervisors should not develop a blame culture which leads to distortion, but should 
be willing to delimit the accountability. Who should supervise is a key issue.  Currently 
this is a dispersed group within their own silos of expertise with civil servants, politicians, 
auditors and others taking part.  There is a need to bring them together.  
Risk governance is the ability to facilitate decision making about risk.  For some it 
is the transference of authority (and accountability) about risk from governments to 
others without assumption of superior authority, see Rosenau (1992) and Wolf (2002, 
2005). We assume that it is applicable to all actors: governments, professional bodies and 
organisations within the private and public sectors (as per Mulgan’s (2000) extended 
sense of accountability) and the public itself, see Figure 1. 
The ownership of the risk and who governs it is fundamental and linked to 
subsequent perceptions of accountability.  Often risks are not managed because there has 
been no assignment of accountability or responsibility for the management of the risk. 
Alternatively accountability may be distributed with differing perceptions of 
responsibility.  Making all stakeholders responsible for the risk overcomes this issue, but 
there needs to be acceptance of capability which leads to knowledgeable supervision. 
According to the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) all employees and employers are 
responsible for health and safety: all the stakeholders are part of the governance of risk. 
Their responsibility and hence accountability, though, will vary with their capability to 
have impact on the risk. It will be dependent on their knowledge and skills.  
25 
 
As can be seen by the notion of shared responsibility (encapsulated within the 
Health and Safety Act) it is clear that collaboration is a feature of ‘knowledgeable 
supervision’. It is acceptance of a collective role in managing the risk perhaps as a 
negotiation. The salience of the stakeholder affects their ability to take action to manage 
the risk, but it does not mean that all individuals do not take some responsibility. In the 
case of child abuse it is acknowledged that families, friends and neighbours, and by 
extension others who come in contact, have a responsibility to act by making those in 
authority aware. This may lead to over supervision (c.f. Edwards and Hulme’s (1995) 
multiple accountabilities), but is likely to lead to a more beneficial outcome. The counter 
to this is peoples’ unwillingness to get involved; leading to potential under supervision, 
but the culture is changing by repeated incidence of cases. For example, NSPCC (2013) 
recorded a 15 percent rise in calls from adults concerned about children, citing 
‘responsibility’, ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ as key reasons for making the call. Parallels can be 
drawn in other contexts, especially in the actions of whistle-blowers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Using public risk as the key context, we have explored risk governance raising 
some of the major issues. Often the ‘knee-jerk’ reaction to a risk is ‘action’: the 
implementation of regulations.  Yet this fails to acknowledge the nature of risk itself, as 
an intangible entity. Our understanding is therefore restricted and our action may 
generate unintended consequences worse than the original risk. Adopting a fatalistic 
approach is far too naïve an approach in these democratic days; the public require to 
have trust in its government and that trust arises from it being able to manage risk.  The 
view that those involved with a risk are likely best placed to deal with risk seems an 
influential view, yet there has to be ‘knowledgeable supervision’.  To rely on this 
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supervision to be adequate is likely to be false: market forces, or public reaction, are 
often seen as a corrective force, but they themselves suffer from insufficient insight. 
What previously were roles of government are now seen as increasingly more 
common, generic societal problems which can be resolved not only by political 
institutions but also by other actors. The main problem is that government no longer has 
a monopoly on the organisation of governance which also poses problems in terms of 
fundamental accountability. This creates somewhat of a paradox in governance and 
accountability. If one accepts the concept of shared governance and accountability then 
the ‘knowledgeable supervision’ should be devolved across the wider group as typified by 
Figure 1. The value of this paper is in providing a map or framework for understanding 
the actors involved in public risk governance; applying a simplifying lens to a complex 
situation.  
Our notion of ‘knowledgeable supervision’ recognises that government does not 
have complete control but can oversee, steer and coordinate. ‘Supervision’ implies that 
other actors must also take an active role and responsibility in the process, akin to the 
network or partnership approaches advocated in models of new governance (Rhodes 
1996). Our notion of ‘knowledgeable supervision’ is underpinned by four key 
characteristics: the co-ordinating role of government, shared responsibility, 
interdependence and authority versus accountability. Within each risk context the precise 
network of risk actors and stakeholders needs to be defined, as well as the roles and 
responsibilities in relation to the governance of risk. The accountability arises out of the 
shared responsibility within the specific network and will be tested by the collective view 
of each actor in the network. We have presented a conceptual framework for further 
analysis. Further research may build on this framework by empirically testing it in risk 
contexts to further understand the interactions, influences and impacts of stakeholders in 
the risk landscape. 
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